Measuring match quality using subjective data by Ferreira, Priscila & Taylor, Mark
 Working Paper Series 
No. 40 
Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada 
Universidade do Minho 
 
 
  
 
 
Measuring match quality using 
subjective data 
Priscila Ferreira  
Mark Taylor 
                             
 
December 2010 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring match quality using subjective data 
 
 
 
Priscila Ferreira 
NIMA and Department of Economics 
University of Minho 
Portugal 
Email: priscila@eeg.uminho.pt 
 
and 
 
Mark Taylor 
(corresponding author) 
Institute for Social and Economic Research 
University of Essex 
Colchester CO4 3SQ 
UK 
Email: taylm@essex.ac.uk 
Tel: +44(0)1206 873553 
Fax: +44(0)1206 873151 
 
 
23 December 2010 
 
 
Abstract: We examine whether data routinely collected in household surveys and 
surveys of workers can be used to construct a measure of underlying match quality 
between worker and firm which helps test matching models and predict subsequent 
labour market outcomes of workers. We use subjective data from employees both on 
reported levels of job satisfaction with various aspects of the current job and on 
whether they would like a new job with a new employer to construct a measure of 
underlying match quality. We then use this to test several implications of matching 
models relating to wage-tenure profiles, wages, separations.   
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1. Introduction  
Job matching models suggest that the quality of the match between a worker and a 
firm can explain a number of stylised facts in the labour market, such as the positive 
correlation between wages and job tenure and the inverse relationship between 
separation rates and job tenure. However the nature of most datasets does not allow us 
to directly identify or measure the value of match quality and tests of the predictions 
of matching model and of the impacts of matching on several labour market outcomes 
are still rare. 
 
Our contribution in this paper is to examine whether data routinely collected in 
household surveys and surveys of workers can be used to construct a measure of 
underlying match quality which helps test matching models and predict subsequent 
labour market outcomes of workers. We use subjective data from employees both on 
reported levels of job satisfaction with various aspects of the current job and on 
whether they would like a new job with a new employer to construct a measure of the 
underlying match quality. We then use this to test several implications of matching 
models relating to wage-tenure profiles, wages, and separations. 
 
The basis of matching models is that workers and firms are heterogeneous, which 
implies that workers differ in their suitability to different firms and consequently their 
productivity will vary across firms. The difficulty in workers identifying the 
characteristics of the firm with precision (and vice versa) generates issues related to 
selection, sorting, and turnover. Matching models therefore rely on imperfect 
information and job mobility results as information is revealed about the current 
match or about possible alternative matches.  
 
The quality of the match between a worker and a firm is determined when the worker 
enters the firm. If the match is an experience good, then its quality is revealed to both 
worker and firm over time as the match continues. Good (or productive) matches are 
likely to continue and to receive higher wage offers within the firm, while poor (or 
unproductive) matches are likely to receive lower wage offers and to result in 
separations from the firm. Because the quality of the match is likely to be identified 
early, poor matches are dissolved earlier than later, which generates the negative 
correlation between tenure and rates of separation (Johnson 1978; Jovanovic 1979a; 
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Viscusi 1980). However it also generates the positive association between wages and 
tenure. This correlation appears not because there are payoffs to accumulated tenure 
but because, as time goes by, bad matches (with lower wages) are destroyed which 
raises the average wage within a cohort. This also generates, all else equal, lower 
wages for a worker who experiences many job separations because the worker rarely 
extracts the rents associated to the progressive identification of the quality of the 
match. If the match is a search good, and workers learn of possible alternative 
matches by searching on the job, then turnover is a process by which worker-firm 
matches are improved (Burdett 1978; Mortensen 1978; Jovanovic 1979b). In this case 
the inverse relationship between job tenure and probability of separation results from 
the growth in match-specific human capital.  
 
Matching models also provide a framework for within-firm career progress as they 
allow employers to establish individual contracts with their workers. Examples of 
individual contracting include a system of promotions or delayed pay increases based 
on the quality of the match. Promotions can also arise from a system of counter-
offers, and are a means of eliciting cooperative behaviour between worker and firm 
when alternative matches are found (Jovanovic 1979a,b; Mortensen 1978).  
 
The empirical implications of matching theory are that estimates of the determinants 
of wages, job separations or promotions will be biased due to the presence of 
unobserved match heterogeneity. Previous research has focused on testing the 
empirical importance of match quality in determining wages and job mobility. Early 
studies attempted to do this using cross-sectional data, while the availability of panel 
data sets of individuals allowed worker unobserved heterogeneity to be explicitly 
modelled (Topel 1986, 1991; Flinn 1986; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; Abraham and 
Farber 1987; Mortensen 1988). Using a structural model of wage dynamics, Flinn 
(1986) reports that 38% of the variance in wages of new labour market entrants is 
attributable to worker-firm-specific heterogeneity. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), using 
an IV approach, find that match quality has a large negative effect on the quit and 
separation probability (and thus positively correlated with job tenure) and that the 
cross-sectional relationship between tenure and wages is a consequence of 
heterogeneity biases. 
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More recently the availability of longitudinal linked employer-employee data (LEED) 
allows for more direct estimation of match effects, together with unobserved worker 
and firm heterogeneity (Abowd et al 1999; Ferreira 2009; Woodcock 2008). Using 
LEED, some authors attempt to estimate the effect of matching and its relative 
importance in explaining wages of workers. Ferreira (2009) finds that unobserved 
match effects account for 6% of wage dispersion of workers that have entered a firm, 
while Woodcock (2008) estimates that they explain about 16% of observed variation 
in wages.  
 
Some authors are attempting new approaches regarding the measurement of job-
match quality. These have focussed on the use of subjective job-satisfaction measures 
collected at the individual level in longitudinal household surveys (Gielen, 2008; 
Gesthuizen 2008). However, in these papers match quality is being inferred from 
separate job satisfaction variables which are measured on a Likert scale. We find the 
partitioned and discrete nature of such measures insufficient and adopt a different 
approach to measuring match quality. We find the partitioned and discrete nature of 
such variables insufficient and unsatisfactory for identifying and quantifying the 
impact of match quality. Also using integer scores of subjective measures may be 
inappropriate as they assume even spacing between scale points, and the distribution 
of scores may be skewed (Bradley et al 1962; Snell 1964). Instead we use factor 
analysis to derive a single measure to identify a worker’s (unobserved) match quality. 
Our model specification follows closely that of Flinn (1986) who uses longitudinal 
data on individuals to identify match quality. However, instead of using structural 
econometric models, in our approach we use factor analysis to create an index of 
match quality using subjective job satisfaction data. We then test this index against 
some predictions of the matching model, relating to the evolution of match quality 
with seniority, individual contracting and separation rates. Our measure of match 
quality behaves as predicted by matching models, as does its effect on compensation 
and job mobility.  
 
2. Data 
We use nine years of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), covering 1998–
2006. This is a nationally representative sample of 5,500 private households originally 
recruited in 1991 containing approximately 10,000 adults interviewed each successive 
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year. If anyone splits from their original household to form a new household, then all 
adult members of the new household are also interviewed. Children in original 
households are interviewed when they reach the age of 16. The core questionnaire 
elicits information on income and earnings, labour market status, housing tenure and 
conditions, household composition, education and health at each annual interview. 
For the purpose of our analysis we will only consider information on men that are in 
full-time employment. We do not consider women in our analysis because of issues 
relating to sample selection, non-random participation in the labour market, and 
secondary earners. We focus on working age men (21–59) in full-time employment 
who do not hold a second job or multiple jobs (to prevent possible contamination of 
responses across jobs).  
 
There are several advantages to using the BHPS for these analyses. Firstly the data are 
longitudinal, which allow us to follow the same group of workers over time and 
identify job mobility. Secondly, the information collected is very rich, and include 
information on labour income, time with employer and a range of individual, 
household and job-related characteristics. Finally, respondents in employment are 
asked a range of questions relating to their subjective evaluation of the quality of the 
match with their current employer. These include questions about job satisfaction with 
various aspects of their current (main) job. In particular at each date of interview, 
employees are asked to rank on a scale of one (completely dissatisfied) to seven 
(completely satisfied) their current job satisfaction overall, their satisfaction with total 
pay, with job security, with the work itself and with the total hours worked in their 
current job. Furthermore, from 1998 onwards, people in employment are asked 
whether or not they would like a new job with a new employer. As we wish to include 
this variable in assessing match quality, we are restricted to using BHPS data from 
1998 onwards. This yields an unbalanced sample which, when excluding cases with 
missing information on any variables of interest, has a sample size 5,192 men 
contributing 21,867 person-year observations. 
 
3. Measuring match quality 
We use subjective data from employees both on reported levels of job satisfaction in 
the current job and on whether they would like a new job with a new employer to 
construct a measure of the underlying match quality. We expect workers who match 
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better with their current employer will report higher levels of satisfaction with the 
various aspects of their job and be less likely to report wanting a new job with a new 
employer. The main assumption in our approach is that the underlying process 
generating the answers to the questions related to job satisfaction is the latent quality 
of the match between the worker and the firm. Therefore, our objective is to derive 
from a set of separate ordinal responses to a series of questions, one single continuous 
measure that reflects the variability observed in these responses. To do so we use two 
strategies: (i) Chronbach’s alpha and (ii) factor analysis. 
 
Cronbachs’ alpha is a coefficient of consistency and measures how well a set of 
variables or items measures a single, unidimensional latent construct, in our case the 
quality of the match. It creates a summative rating scale composed of a set of 
variables – the scale is the sum of the individual item scores (reversing the scoring for 
variables that have negative correlations with the factor being measured). It takes a 
value between 0 and 1, with one indicating perfect internal consistency. The literature 
suggests that a good summary indicator should have a value of alpha of at least 0.7 
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The internal consistency of the principle underlying 
factor reflected in responses to variables capturing job satisfaction and the desire for a 
new job with a new employer yields a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79 and an average inter-
item correlation of 0.38. This suggests that the individual variables all contribute to 
the underlying match quality component in the same way and empirically supports 
combining them into a single indicator. 
 
We derive a single continuous measure of match quality that reflects the variability 
observed in responses to these questions using factor analysis, and regression scoring 
in particular. Factor analysis is a data reduction method used to describe variability 
among observed variables in terms of fewer unobserved (latent) variables called 
factors. Therefore, it is used to uncover the latent structure (dimensions) of a set of 
variables. It reduces attribute space from a larger number of variables to a smaller 
number of factors and as such is a “non-dependent” procedure. Following Zinbarg et 
al. (2005) and Zinbarg et al. (2006) we use higher order exploratory factor analysis 
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using the principal factor method of extraction. The loadings on the highest order 
rotated factor are then used as the estimated match-quality loadings.1  
 
Table 1 summarises levels and changes in our match quality indicator between two 
consecutive BHPS dates of interview (t and t+1) by type of job mobility. This shows 
that on average match quality falls slightly from one year to the next while workers 
that remain with the same employer have higher than average match quality (0.02). 
Workers that subsequently separate from their employer have significantly lower 
match quality. Those that go on to quit a job have an average match quality of –0.30 
compared with –0.17 for those that will be laid off. This is consistent with theory – 
separations occur where the quality of the worker-firm match is low. As predicted by 
matching theories, workers who separate and find new employment within the next 
year on average increase their match quality, which is largest (0.56) for those who 
quit.  
 
These descriptive patterns indicate that the constructed measure of match quality 
behaves as predicted by economic theory. In Figures 1 and 2 we document other 
evidence that suggests the match quality variable is consistent with the predictions of 
matching models. In Figure 1 we plot average match quality by seniority, defined as 
years with the current employer. Matching models suggest that the wage-seniority 
profile arises because well-matched workers remain with the firm while poorly 
matched workers leave. If this is true, then the average match quality should be higher 
for workers with more seniority than for those with less seniority. Figure 1 indicates 
that this relationship emerges clearly in our data. Average match quality initially falls 
as workers learn about the qualities of the firm and their working environment. At this 
time workers in poor matches leave the firm, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and 
then average match quality improves as only well-matched workers remain with the 
firm. Figure 2 instead plots the average variance in match quality by seniority. If 
match quality is an experience good, then matching models suggest that the variance 
in match quality should fall with seniority, as the flow of new information to the 
worker on the quality of the match declines over time with the firm. Initially there will 
be a large flow of new information to the worker on the quality of the match, and so 
                                                 
1
 Results presented are robust to constructing the continuous match quality indicator using a number of 
different methods such as principle component analysis and Cronbach’s alpha. 
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reported match quality will vary as the worker learns and absorbs this information and 
re-evaluates the match quality towards its ‘true’ value, resulting in a high match 
quality variance. Over time with the firm, this information flow slows as the worker 
becomes familiar with his working environment, and hence the true match quality is 
revealed. This pattern is exactly replicated in Figure 2, which shows that the variance 
in match quality falls with seniority. 
 
Therefore descriptive statistics indicate that our match quality indicator behaves in 
ways that are consistent with the predictions of matching models. Workers in worse 
matches separate from their employer, while those in good matches are promoted. 
Similarly, workers who separate on average find employment in firms with whom 
they match better. In the remainder of the paper we test these descriptive findings 
more robustly using multivariate analysis. 
 
4. Estimation  
To test our measure of match quality against the predictions of matching theory, we 
estimate a series of three models. The first series of models examines the relationship 
between match quality and wages. If the quality of the match has a non-zero impact 
on wages, and if it is correlated with observable characteristics, then procedures that 
do not allow for match quality can result in biased estimates. In a matching model, the 
log of real wages of the ith worker at the jth firm at time t ( ijty ) is given by: 
 
ijtijjijtitijt zxay εγψθϖβ ++++++=  [1] 
 
where a  is the general mean, itx  is a vector of worker characteristics, jtz is a vector 
of firm characteristics, iθ  captures worker-specific time-invariant unobserved effects 
(such as motivation, ability and ambition), and jψ captures firm-specific time-
invariant unobserved effects (such as firm-specific remuneration policies). ijγ  is the 
unobserved match effect (which can be, for example, the worker-firm specific 
productivity, a production complementarities component or performance on the job) 
and measures the time-invariant heterogeneity associated to the match of a worker 
with a firm. ijtε is random error. 
9 
 
 
Empirical estimations of wage equations differ in their treatment of the (unobserved) 
worker ( iθ ), firm ( jtz ) and match effects ( ijγ ). In particular, results based on cross-
sectional individual level data and estimated using OLS assume that each is 
orthogonal to the covariates. However if the unobserved effects are correlated with 
covariates then OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. The availability of 
individual-level panel data allows unobserved worker effects to be controlled for, and 
thus removing one source of potential bias. More recently, longitudinal linked 
employer-employee data (LEED) have become available in some countries which 
allow for more direct estimation of match effects, together with unobserved worker 
and firm heterogeneity (Abowd et al 1999; Ferreira 2009; Woodcock 2008). 
However, such data typically lack contextual information on workers and their 
background, potentially introducing omitted variable biases.  
 
By attempting to measure match quality indirectly from data on workers, we fall 
somewhere in between. Our data are rich enough to include a large amount of 
contextual information on observed worker characteristics and the firms in which they 
are employed, as well as unobserved worker effects. In addition we include our 
measure of match quality. However as our sample is based on workers, we are unable 
to include firm-specific unobservables. Thus the model to be estimated becomes: 
 
ijtijijtitijt zxay εηγθϖβ +++++=  [2] 
 
We estimate [2] using within-group fixed effects, which relies on the assumption of 
strict exogeneity but allow worker-specific unobserved effects to be arbitrarily 
correlated with the covariates. Matching models predict that η is positive – workers in 
a better worker-firm match enjoy higher wages than those in a poor worker-firm 
match.  
 
As well as receiving higher wages, matching models predict that well matched 
workers are unlikely to separate. We test our measure of match quality against this 
theoretical prediction by estimating a job separation model. Here the observed 
dependent variable, its , is binary, taking the value one if the worker separated from 
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his employer between t and t+1 and zero if he remained with the same employer. A 
separation is defined as a quit or a layoff, as matching models predict both are more 
likely when there is a poor worker-firm match. The model is specified as: 
 
itsijisitxs it εηγθβ +++=*  [3] 
 
where *
it
s denotes the unobservable propensity for the worker to separate between t 
and t+1, itx is a vector of observable characteristics that influence *its . iθ denotes the 
individual-specific time-invariant unobservable effect and itε is random error. By 
treating the iθ as random, this can be estimated using a random effects probit model 
under the common assumption that ( )2,0~ εσε INit  and are orthogonal to the other 
covariates. 
 
This framework assumes that the time-invariant unobserved individual-specific 
effects are independent of the observable characteristics. This is quite realistic here as 
more able and highly motivated people are, for example, more likely to have higher 
education levels, be more aware of alternative employment opportunities, more likely 
to be promoted, and less likely to be laid off. In this case some of the estimated 
coefficients of interest ( β and η ) will pick up some of the effects of the unobservable 
iθ . To avoid this problem we relax the assumption that iθ  is independent of the 
observable time-varying covariates, following Chamberlain (1984) and Mundlak 
(1978). We model dependence between iθ  and observables by assuming that the 
regression function of iθ  is linear in the mean values of the time-varying covariates: 
 
iiiii bxa µηγθ +++=  [4] 
 
We assume that µ are independent of x  and γ , ix refers to the vector of mean values 
of the time-varying covariates over time and iγ refers to the vector of mean values of 
match quality for individual i over time. The coefficients in b that correspond to the 
time-invariant variables are set equal to zero. Equation [3] therefore becomes: 
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itiiisijsit bxxs it εµηγηγβ +++++=*  [5] 
 
This is equivalent to the random effects probit with additional regressors ix and iγ . 
 
Our models take into account a wide range of other individual and job-related 
characteristics that are likely to determine wages, separations and promotions. These 
include variables intended to capture labour market attachment, job search intensity, 
job offer arrival and job retention rates. All models include controls for age and its 
square, highest education qualification, marital status and number of children, and 
whether the worker experienced an employment interruption in the previous year. Job 
and employer characteristics include sector of employment, firm size, trade union 
coverage, pension scheme membership, place of work, seniority, occupation, whether 
receive increments or bonus payments, and whether there are opportunities for 
promotion in the current job. Region of residence and year dummies are also 
included. 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents estimated coefficients on the match quality variable from wage 
equations, where we normalise match quality in terms of standard deviations from the 
mean. Our estimates are consistent with matching models. In the OLS regression, 
having match quality of one standard deviation above the mean relates to earning 
4.1% higher wages. However this is positively biased as more motivated and able 
workers are both more likely to earn higher wages and to search for suitable worker-
firm matches. Within-group fixed effects estimates, which remove such bias, reveal a 
smaller coefficient that remains statistically significant – having match quality of one 
standard deviation above the sample mean relates to earning 3.2% higher wages. 
Therefore we find the measure of match quality is statistically significantly associated 
with wages, consistent with theory. Furthermore, robustness and specification tests 
reveal that the match quality measure yields a higher model R2 than including each of 
the relevant component variables in separate models (results available from the 
authors on request). 
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Table 3 shows the importance of match quality relative to other observed 
characteristics in explaining wages. Row 1 presents the R2 from the fully specified 
model and row 2 the error. Row 3 (5) presents the R2 when just the covariates (match 
quality) are included, and row 4 (6) allocates the difference between the fully 
specified model to match quality (other covariates). According to OLS estimates 
match quality explains 1–2% of the total variance in wages, while other observed 
characteristics explain 45%. The fixed effects model attributes 1.1% of the total 
variance in wages to match quality. These estimates of the importance of match 
quality in explaining wages are in line with those from LEED data (Ferreira 2009). 
 
Table 4 shows marginal effects from pooled and random effects probit models of job 
separation. A job separation is defined as either a quit for a better job, a layoff 
(redundancy) or a quit for other reasons (look after family or home, for example). It is 
intended to capture between-firm mobility. Consistent with matching models, the 
probability of separation is negatively related to match quality and the sizes of the 
effects are relatively large and statistically significant. In the pooled probit having 
match quality one standard deviation above the mean reduces the probability of 
separation by 3.2 percentage points. This is a large impact, given that the average 
separation probability was 0.2. In the random effects specification the size of the 
effect is larger, reducing the probability of separation by 4.4 percentage points. 
Therefore, consistent with matching models, we find that workers in a better worker-
firm match have a lower probability of subsequent separation than workers in poorer 
matches. Again, specification tests reject models including each component variable 
separately in favour of the model including the match quality measure.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Our purpose is to show that combining several distinct indicators of employees’ 
subjective perceptions of match quality into a single composite measure yields a 
variable that behaves according to matching models, and which allows us to identify 
and quantify the impact of match quality on wages and turnover.  We argue that using 
a single ordinal measure of job satisfaction as an indicator of match quality is too 
simplistic and unsatisfactory. Instead latent match quality is better captured using 
satisfaction across different dimensions of the job and other subjective information 
reported by the employee. Our approach of constructing a single ‘match quality’ 
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measure from responses to a number of different questions related to job satisfaction 
and desire for a new job with a new employer allows us to identify the relationships 
between match quality and various outcomes in a simple and direct way. The 
estimated latent match-quality behaves as predicted by matching models, as does its 
effect on compensation and job mobility. Furthermore, specification and robustness 
tests indicate that this composite measure improves the fit of wage and job separation 
models relative to models in which each component variable is included separately. 
We therefore suggest its inclusion in analyses of these topics both in order to reduce 
omitted variable bias in the estimates obtained, and to directly identify the impact of 
match quality on outcomes of interest. 
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Table 1: Average match quality variable by job mobility 
 
Mean Change t to t+1 N 
Total –0.004 –0.020 21867 
Mobility between t and t+1    
None 0.022 –0.028 15307 
Will quit  –0.301 0.558 1064 
Will be laid off/dismissed  –0.174 0.101 221 
Will separate for other reasons  –0.213 0.025 827 
Notes: BHPS 1998–2006. See text for how match quality defined. 
 
Table 2: Impact of match quality on wages 
 
OLS FE 
Match quality 0.041 0.032 
 
[11.18] [14.58] 
R2 0.460 0.163 
N observations 21867 
N individuals 5192 
Notes: BHPS 1998–2006. Dependent variable is log(real 
hourly wage). See text for details of other control variables 
and for how match quality is defined. 
 
 
Table 3: Contribution of match quality to total wage variation 
Source of wage variation Share of TSS 
 OLS  FE 
1 Covariates & match (A) 0.460 0.163 
2 Error (1–A) 0.540 0.837 
Covariates first   
3 Covariates (B) 0.454 0.152 
4 Match (A–B) 0.006 0.011 
Match first   
5 Match (C) 0.016 0.011 
6 Covariates (A–C) 0.444 0.152 
N observations 21867 21867 
N covariates 63 63 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of match quality at t on probability of job separation t to t+1 
 
Pooled Random effects 
Match quality –0.032 –0.044 
 
[12.07] [13.28] 
Rho  0.108 
Log-likelihood –9671.1 –9365.6 
N observations 21867 
N individuals 5192 
Notes: BHPS 1998–2006. Marginal effects from probit models. 
Dependent variable is experiencing a job separation between t and 
t+1. See text for details of other control variables and for how match 
quality is defined. 
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